

EXHIBIT NO. 109

(Exhibit No. 109 consists of a Guide to Symbols and of Maps submitted by Admiral R. K. Turner showing the location of ships December 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941 and will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

EXHIBIT NO. 110

SECRET

9 FEBRUARY 1940.

DEAR ADMIRAL: I was glad to get your letter of January 4 and I will follow your suggestion by sending this out by officer messenger.

You want to know, what is in the back of my mind—I will set out for a broad coverage for I am not sure just what you want—so here goes:

As far as what you would do in an emergency, there has been no change in the basic plans with which you are thoroughly familiar from your reading in the Department prior to taking over as CinC, Asiatic. I am told that you also read the CinCUS plans, which makes it unnecessary for me to go into them here except to say there has been no change.

I am in general agreement with the Asiatic Fleet Plan except possibly in the case of the destroyers. The destroyer logistic problems involved in the support of the long continued operations with the cruisers, as contemplated, might prove difficult and might hamper the cruiser operations. One recommendation which has been made to me is that the destroyers should remain at Manila with the submarines and patrol planes as long as practicable and then retire to the eastward. This is for the purpose of harassing enemy shipping in the near vicinity and for operations against enemy steamships which might act again our own and neutral shipping. Retiring destroyers would require such logistic support as might be necessary to permit them to join the Fleet to the eastward of Guam.

It may be that after further study you may desire to change the planned employment of the destroyers. You may want to divide them, using some of them on the operations now planned and the remainder on other tasks. You may even want to recommend a change in the major mission assigned to the Asiatic Fleet in the Basic Plan. Any such recommendations along these lines will of course be given great weight and study.

It is to be borne in mind of course that the present War Plans have been formulated as a result of studies continuing over an extended period by a number of officers. They follow Army-Navy joint plans. In the Navy Basic Plan the Asiatic Fleet Plan has been related and articulated to the U. S. Fleet Plan.

[2] The existing plan,—and for that matter any plan,—should, in my opinion, be changed by only one of two processes,—either after careful thought and investigation of the effect of the change in the Orange Plan as a whole, or, as a result, in time of war or emergency, of the factual aspects of the situation. The changes then made (in war or emergency) may be brought about by the

President, by the Navy Department, or by the responsible Operating Task Force Commander on the spot. It may be that the employment of the United States Fleet itself,—the Joint Asiatic Force—will be changed when the emergency arises. It may be that the employment of the forces of the Asiatic Fleet can not be carried out as planned because of the existing conditions.

I feel that the main problem confronting you as Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, does not lie with what to do when war has been definitely joined. At such a juncture, guided by plans, directives, conditions, and your own considered thought on the problem, I feel confident that you will be able to make decisions essentially correct, and better than they could be made elsewhere. The main problem lies rather, (and this was undoubtedly in your mind when you wrote), with what to do during a period of growing tension which may or may not culminate in war. In this connection it is to be noted that War Plans, as now conceived and prepared, follow the basic premise that war, (actual hostilities), has broken out. This is, of course, by no means always the case. As so frequently exemplified in recent years, armed forces may be employed in varying degrees, without being followed by an actual outbreak of war. Even when actual hostilities do break out they may or may not be accompanied by a formally declared war, and the extent of hostilities may be restricted or may be unlimited.

In view of the actual situation existing today, in the Far East and elsewhere, we might well say that we need "Tension Plans" as well as "War Plans". But to prepare well considered "Tension Plans" we need a planning machinery that includes the State Department and possibly the Treasury Department as well as the War and Navy Departments. Of course, we have planning machinery for the Army and Navy which now provides for a better coordination of planning effort than has existed in the past. We do not, however, have regularly set up planning machinery that brings in the State Department. It is true that we have frequent consultation with the State Department, but things are not planned in advance, and often we do not receive advance information of State Department action which might well have effected our own activities.

It is also true, of course, that the State Department must in a country such as ours feel its way along to a large extent. This is unavoidable. In view of this the State Department is probably unable always to set up, in advance, concrete programs of their intentions.

[3] In the absence of the machinery for, or possibility of, planned coordinated action, I feel that naval commanders must continue—and they do continue to employ their forces in the support of the national purpose and the national policy in such manner and to such extent that they can make the support effectively with the forces available.

It seems to me to be the case, generally in life, that when a confusing and disturbing situation presents itself those who are confused and uncertain tend to orient their ideas and their actions and to rally around anyone capable of taking a decisive attitude and determined action, even though this one himself may be not too certain of what should be done. However, I know this is an unnecessary comment in your case. There is no substitute for good judgment.

A primary objective that continuously confronts naval commanders, particularly those in the "front line trench" as you express it, is the effective support of policy in a manner that does not result in war. The effective support prevents the adversary from being stimulated by the appearance of weakness, but the effective support must of course be tempered by the avoidance of provocative action. I feel that the people of the United States will support firm action as long as it does not go into a degree of jingoism that would serve to provoke the other fellow, and that if in the face of such firm but restrained attitude Japan should step on our toes, that our country will realize that Japan herself has provoked the action.

I realize very well the conflicting considerations with which you are faced. By continuing your forces, or a portion of your forces, at the point of conflict—the "Front Line Trenches" between the Japanese and the United States' interests,—you sustain United States' interests. If as the tension increases, you, or your forces stay on the spot you thereby continue to sustain these interests, may stay the hand of Japan, and may be the means of avoiding war instead of provoking it.

At the same time the longer these forces remain on the spot the greater their danger of being cut off and destroyed. If they leave too early, or leave precipitately, they may be saved but this action may not only fail to give maximum support to our interests but may even be the means of provoking war by a Japan which is apt to respond with aggressiveness to a show of weakness; and to

respond with a hesitating attitude to a show of strength and determination on our part.

On the other hand, if your forces stay on the spot too long in the face of threatening dispositions of Japanese force they may be unduly and inextricably jeopardized. It seems that some degree of exposure of a portion of the forces of the Asiatic Fleet is unavoidable. If we are not willing to expose them, not only will we face the surrender of interests and policies, but we accept a weakened position and loss of prestige, and may even bring on a war, (after we have weakened our position) that we have desired to avoid.

[4] Aside from the forces that must be exposed, for a period at least, to this increasing threat and danger, I presume that the situation will guide you into keeping other forces of the Asiatic Fleet strategically deposited in a manner that will prevent their being contained by Japanese forces and will permit them to take counter measures against Japanese forces or interests. In this way, of course, they too support the forces exposed.

Undoubtedly the disposition of your forces could be better guided if you could be kept advised in advance of actions contemplated by the State Department. Whenever it is possible to do so, we will keep you so advised, and whenever State Department policies for either temporary or longer contemplated periods can be set forth, I will keep you informed of them.

Under conditions as they are, it seems to me, that you must continue to meet each situation with the adroit firmness that has characterized your attitude and that of your predecessors,—even though exposure of some of the forces of the Asiatic Fleet is necessarily involved. I feel that the Navy Department will continue to support such a firm position. It is the Department's intention to maintain the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific and that fact may have an important moral effect in the support of your own tactful handling of any incident.

We keep the State Department advised of your letters, also the President. They are glad to get your letters. We are continually on the lookout with the State Department for anything of moment and of interest to you. To date nothing has been forthcoming other than what you know from despatches. I feel safe in saying that at present the State Department does not believe war probable in the near future, at least not in 1940; and that any pressure they put on they hope to apply in such a manner as not to precipitate a final crisis. Of course, they are in close touch with Senator Pittman who is the sponsor of an embargo bill. As framed, this will would permit the President to prescribe as to if and when to apply it. In other words, it can be used advisedly along with other forms of pressure. We will make every effort to keep you in touch with the situation, which is now, with the abrogation of the treaty, getting into a stage which will be interesting to say the least.

With reference (in your letter of December 1) to the reversal of our attitude on your proposal relative to defense of Shanghai settlements. I will simply state now that when I sent you the despatch I did so after a conference, at which, I, at least personally understood the stand represented to be a Government stand and one which the State Department fully approved. Somebody reversed. Either I was wrong or the State was wrong in the understanding. However, that is water over the dam and I think it better to let it stay that way. I simply want to let you know that here in the Navy Department we felt we were on sound ground and acting in perfect good faith with the State Department. I had some uncomfortable moments and so did the State Department before the second telegram was sent to you. It is only fair to assume we were both acting in good faith.

[5] You know Harry Yarnell thinks we should never precipitate anything in the Western Pacific unless the principally interested powers (United States-French-British-Dutch) act in concert. The possibility of getting such concerted action appears to me to be improbable during the present unpredictable state of affairs in Europe. We have been turning over in our heads whether you could use Hongkong, Singapore, North Borneo, or French or Dutch possessions, but there is no indication that any of them would be available. If we have to intern anything and have any option, naturally it would be desirable to select ports in countries which might be with us later, or at least friendly to us.

To return to some of the purely naval aspects of the situation, there have been added certain forces for which the plans now available in the Department do not provide. In regard to patrol planes I presume that they should be added to the local defense forces to work in conjunction with destroyers and submarines and with the Army. I assume that they would remain in Manila Bay for approximately the same time as the submarines, although it may be found

necessary to send away the tender early in the game. This of course can be determined only by the man on the spot with full recognition of existing conditions. If they have to look for shelter they probably would have more freedom of movement for internment in Singapore, for example, than any other port—and of course internment in Singapore might well turn out not to be internment in the end. It might be possible to have them work their way back home depending on the situation in Guam, Wake, and Midway.

The mining situation is receiving a great deal of thought in particular as a result of Smeallie's letter. We have authorization for the construction of mine stowage at Marivales, but it appears inapplicable, and may be undesirable, to attempt to get money for that purpose at this time. For the present it would appear necessary to continue this stowage at Cavite.

Another problem arises, however, on the question of mine stowage. The six P-class submarines that we sent you are not now fitted to handle submarine torpedo tube mines but I am advised that they can be so fitted by providing stowage and handling fittings for mines, both fore and aft. I believe that this work can be accomplished by the submarines being laid up for no longer a period than two or three weeks. It would be highly desirable in my opinion for these submarines to be fitted to lay mines and for mines to be available for this purpose at Manila. This would involve a minimum of 48 mines per submarine or a minimum for which stowage capacity would be required for about 300 of these mines. We would be glad to have your thought and recommendation on this point.

We have no mines at present suitable for laying by aircraft.

In regard to logistics, provision must be made of course for oil and rendezvous. We realize that and the War Plans provide for it. In addition to what provision we can make, I [6] assume you would exercise a perfectly free reign and would arrange to charter what you would consider to be necessary if suitable vessels can be found available.

I have not mentioned the Marines or the Army. I have talked to Holcomb. He does not know himself just what the plan is for the Marines, but states that that depends almost entirely on arrangements more or less under your control, as for example hooking up with the Chinese, removal, and, in the last analysis, possible capture.

I have taken up the question of reinforcements for the Philippines by the Army—both troops and planes. I think Marshall would be glad to send them if he had them. I suggested a minimum of 20,000 men and a considerable number of planes. Of course I realize that they would have to be sent out more or less unostentatiously, if we were ever able to send them, and frankly, of this I have very little hope—just at present *NONE*. Our army seems to be so dispersed, so small, so lacking in material and so few units available outside of the essentials in Hawaii and the Canal that the outlook for stationing any considerable detachment elsewhere looks hopeless just now.

The question of the relief of the *AUGUSTA* is in the mill at present. I am referring it to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, with the idea of getting the *AUGUSTA* back for a much needed overhaul and for an increase in her antiaircraft battery, including other important military alterations. The nigger in the wood pile just now is that the only ship available is the *HOUSTON* which has been fixed up for more or less quick use by the President whenever he wants to cruise in the Pacific. We are hoping to be able to fix up another ship at no great cost. Whether it will be the *HOUSTON*, the *INDIANAPOLIS* or the *CHICAGO* we will inform you after the threshing it out here. I assume it makes no difference to you. Of course whatever you get will be one of the modified ships, with the increased antiaircraft battery of 8 guns.

I have had a copy made up of allotments which we have recently sent you although if I remember this has been previously covered.

Please excuse the length of this letter but as it will come by officer messenger I have tried to cover what I thought you had in mind about being kept in touch.

As an item of interest the question of whether to stay in the Philippines or get out of the Philippines has recently been debated in the Town Hall program—New York. One of the speakers was Mr. Paul McNutt. I am enclosing a record of that meeting.

My own personal feeling is that we cannot do other than get out unless the Filipinos of their own volition and in no uncertain voice request us to remain. There is a point of honor involved as I see it which must be followed.

[7] Of course I could indulge in some wishful thinking that consistent with the foregoing we could greatly improve Guam for possible future contingencies. What is your opinion on this?

I trust that Carolyn has fully recovered by now and that you and all the little Harts are fine. Your prospective daughter-in-law was in the Department the other day and those who saw her said she was an exceptional, highly intelligent, fine looking girl. Am sorry to say I missed her.

Keep cheerful—all good wishes.

Sincerely,

Admiral T. C. HART,

*U. S. Navy, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
USS AUGUSTA.*

Since dictating the foregoing, I have your letter of 29 Jan.—I would work neither my planes nor my ships not one whit more than I felt the situation called for—in fact I would conserve them just as far as possible.

H. R. STARK.

22 OCTOBER 1940.

DEAR TOMMY: You will have heard from J. O. Richardson via the HOUSTON before this reaches you and I really haven't much to add.

I was tickled to pieces over your going on to Manila as per your plans and scratched off a despatch with quick approval in which Colonel Knox thoroughly concurred.

I am delighted that you have practically all important units out of China but here again, we are leaving this entirely to your discretion.

The situation is not good and does not seem to be improving but just how critical it is no one ever knows.

I wish there was something I could give you from the State Department but there isn't. I think I may say safely, however, that there will be no backdown anywhere by the United States in the Far East, unless there is a right-about-face in present day policy.

JO's memorandum to you really gave all my thoughts and this note is just to let you know we are thinking about you and are glad you are on the job. I noted that in acknowledging my last letter you did not use the word "affirmative" which I asked you to send if you approved of the idea to send some heavy cruisers to you.

I am delighted over the prospect of getting our women and children out of the Far East and know what a relief it will be to you to give them the opportunity to come home, and also the knowledge that no more will be permitted to go out.

Every good wish as always.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral T. C. HART,

*U. S. Navy, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
USS AUGUSTA.*

[1] Secret

12 NOVEMBER, 1940.

Dear Tommy,

We are pushing ahead as rapidly as possible on the preparation of material and personnel for any eventualities. While there is much still to be done (a condition that will continue to exist for years) I can not say that matters are unsatisfactory, so far as concerns things under my control. But we do not yet know the direction which affairs may take.

For the past three weeks I have been spending many hours, together with a group of officers particularly concerned, in developing a broad estimate of the material situation as it affects possible naval war operations. This estimate, or study, is now in the hands of the President. I do not expect any immediate decision, but do hope that it will serve to clarify matters so that, at least, those in authority will be fully aware of the implications of any particular policy that may be adopted with respect to the war.

Ghormley tells me the British expected us to be in the war within a few days after the reelection of the President—which is merely another evidence of their slack ways of thought, and of their non-realistic views of international political conditions, and of our own political system. They have been talking, in a large way, about the defense of the Malay Barrier, with an alliance between them-

selves, us, and the Dutch, without much thought as to what the effect would be in Europe. But we have no idea as to whether they would at once begin to fight were the Dutch alone, or were we alone, to be attacked by the Japanese. Then again, the copy of the British Far Eastern War Plan which Thomas obtained at Singapore, shows much evidence of their usual wishful thinking. Furthermore, though I believe the Dutch colonial authorities will resist an attempt to capture their islands, I question whether they would fight if only the Philippines, or only Singapore, were attacked.

The Navy can, of course, make no political commitments. Therefore, we can make no specific military plans for an allied war. However, as I told you in my despatch, you can perform a useful service by laying, with the British and possibly the Dutch, a framework for a future plan of cooperation, should we be forced into the war. I rather doubt, however, that the Dutch will talk freely with you. If they do my idea would be that you would explore [2] the fields of:

Command arrangements,

General objectives,

General plan of cooperative action, including the approximate naval and military deployment.

You are, of course, committed to assist the Army in the defense of Luzon. But with allied bases to fall back on, your direct support of the Army might well fall short, in degree, of the support you would afford were we alone to fight Japan.

I do not believe Japan will attack us if she can avoid doing so. In fact, I believe she will go far to avoid hostilities with the United States. It is even doubtful if she wishes, at this time to fight the British or the Dutch. It seems more likely that she would prefer, while maintaining a position in readiness, to consolidate Indo-China with her positions further north, and to begin a more or less gradual economic penetration of the Netherlands East Indies and Siam. Should we refrain from imposing additional economic sanctions, present conditions, including the recent 1,800,000 ton oil contract might be stabilized over a considerable period of the future. Our State Department, as you may know, had a hand in the execution of that contract.

But we never can tell. Should a war develop between Japan and an alliance of British, Dutch and Americans, I believe that Japan will plan to:

(a) Occupy Guam, and reforce the Mandates with troops, submarines, and some air;

(b) Establish naval control of Philippine waters by destroying our naval and air forces, basing her main fleet in the Pescadores and a strong, fast detachment in Halmahera;

(c) Capture Luzon with troops now based in Formosa and Hainan;

(d) Capture Borneo, to be followed by a campaign against the Dutch directed from East to West.

I believe that the allied objective should be to reduce Japan's offensive power through economic starvation; the success of the blockade would surely depend upon allied ability to hold the major portion of the Malay Barrier. Your own action would, of course, be based upon your view as to the most effective method of contributing to the attainment of the ultimate objective.

One thing (and this is for your ears alone) you can depend upon is that we would support you, probably by sending a naval reinforcement to you at Soerabaja or Singapore, and by other means. I would be glad to get your views as to the size and composition of such a reinforcement; but in making your recommendation I trust you will keep in mind that our Navy must hold in the Mid-Pacific, that we may also be in the war against the other two Axis Powers, and that the collapse of Britain would force us to a major re-orientation toward the Atlantic.

You may well appreciate that I do not welcome such a war (British Collapse).

The naval part of the War Plan, Rainbow III, for this possible war is about completed, and will be on its way to you within a short time. We are hoping to send naval attachés to Singapore, Batavia, Soerabaja, Balikpapan, and Ceylon; possibly one of these officers may bring this plan to you via air transportation.

We are all delighted to be able to put over the dependent thing for you. The State Department strongly supported us. I can appreciate the coals that must have been heaped upon you when it was learned that, while we were forcing our dependents home, the Army was sending dependents out.

You know how glad I always am for any opportunity to assist any or all of the Little Harts, as well as the Big Hart, in any way in which I can.

Keep cheerful,
Sincerely

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral T. C. HART,

U. S. Navy Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

P. S. Am sixty today. Here's hoping! The first three score are the hardest!

Admiral HART

18 NOVEMBER 1940.

P. S. Admiral Brownson's name is being submitted to the President on the list going over to him for consideration in connection with the new destroyer. Here's hoping.

Secret
Op-10-MD

AUGUST 28, 1941.

DEAR TOMMY: Since I last wrote you, much water has gone over the dam.

I will not burden you with my recent cruise in the Atlantic and the meeting with the British, except to tell you that it was extremely interesting. I hope and believe much good will result. If nothing else, the fact that we got to know each other very well is bound to be helpful.

This morning, I had a long talk with Mr. Juiji Kasai, member of the Japanese Parliament. I was very frank with him, as I have been with Admiral Nomura, and I find that they both seem to feel very much the same way. I think I have written you how much Admiral Nomura has impressed us with his sincere desire that our countries solve their problems amicably. There is no doubt in my mind but that he has no stomach whatever for the Tri-partite Agreement, and the same applies to Mr. Kasai. I still have some hopes, or, to put it in another way, have not given up hope that peace in the Pacific may be maintained. However, I could wish that hope were not sustained by such a slender thread.

Whether or not the Japanese will go into Thailand, I do not know. There is no doubt but that if they do, the reaction in the United States will be bad. This has been made very plain to our Japanese friends here, and, therefore, to the home government.

I am continuing to urge strengthening of the Army forces in the Philippines, particularly in planes and mechanized equipment, and I hope some tangible results will take shape.

The Russian situation has complicated the entire picture. Ambassador Ouman-sky and some of their military men from Russia are coming in tomorrow, and I know that their demands will be very urgent.

[2] There is a good deal of a three-ring circus going on hereabouts. Shortages in raw materials become more acute daily. We have our own job of enormous expansion in every department. We are pressed from all over the world to sustain the forces actually fighting at the front and, of course, we recognize the importance of this. All in all, there is a never-ending problem of struggles for priority, and this is only one of the many problems involved—and it is a tough one.

You guessed quite right with regard to our feeling about ADB. We told the British in our recent meeting what we thought of it. They now have our official letters, so one of these days we may be expecting a reply. Incidentally, I was very frank with Admiral Pound with regard to the Command situation which you have pictured in the Far East. I hope the changes which have or will take place will be helpful.

I know about the very indiscreet radio and other leaks with regard to those recently sent to China. I have taken it up with those concerned, and here's hoping for at least some semblance of secrecy on the next one. Anyway, we shall try.

Regarding the location of the fuel oil tanks:—I was ready to accept your recommendation without going back again because, as you know, we said we would leave the decision up to you. However, Ben Moreell felt a little better after I sent the wire and your confirmation of your previous decision.

Not much general news.

We have something over 262,000 men in the Navy, of whom about 40,000 are reserves. Reenlistments for the year have averaged a little over 70 per cent—and still are. We are aiming for a monthly quota of 12,000 recruits, and I hope will attain it this fall. We have, as you may know, put on a very extensive advertising campaign in the South and in the Middle West farm belt. I am more thankful every day that I have Nimitz as a side partner at this time. I hope you enjoyed the letter which the Bureau of Navigation is sending out in the interest of increasing our reenlistments. After all, that is the greatest recruiting ground we have if we can make it effective.

Of course, the heavy expansion puts a terrific burden on the forces afloat, but it seems inevitable that it happens that way. [3] As you know, I started in almost the minute I got here for great expansion in personnel, but, like everything else, it takes TIME.

There is much talk at present regarding possibility of Japanese interference with our sending material to Russia; that is, if it goes between the Japanese Islands and through the Sea of Japan to the Maritime Provinces. I rather doubt if they will take any immediate action, because it seems to me they are in one of those hesitation periods, but, of course, it is something that can not be discounted. Have you any line at all on the efficiency of the Russian submarines in the Pacific. Do you recommend any Staff talks with them? When the question you raised concerning closing the Sulu Sea came up here, I felt it inadvisable to make any proclamation, at least at that time for fear that later on, for some reason or other, the Japanese might use such an action by us as a precedent for their closing the Sea of Japan. However, people don't seem to need much in the way of precedent in these days, that being more of a case of "Can one get away with it?"

We are directing Kimmel today to start his Southeast Force of two light cruisers, which you will recall WPL-51 envisaged. We have a Radar in the Galapagos Area—incidentally, another one just at present Southeast of Bermuda. We are starting considerable operations between North America and Iceland and the Good Lord knows if the Germans want an excuse for war, they have plenty. I have had just exactly 11¼ hours at this desk so far today, and I am afraid this letter will be terribly disjointed and loose, but I just felt like sitting down and talking to you for a while. I am going up to the Old Allies Inn for a bite and am coming back to finish up. There seems no end to it. Things move so slowly at times, but I suppose no matter how they move, we would still be impatient. Anyway, here's hoping, and every good wish to you in the wide world, as always.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral THOMAS C. HAET, U. S. N.
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
U. S. S. Houston, c/o Postmaster,
San Francisco, California.

[4] P. S. I hope to get up home over Sunday—Labor Day. I realise how much that would mean to you too. I often recall what someone once told me—"In this man's Navy, hard work gets you more hard work"—and no truer words were ever said.

I just had a happy thought and indulged myself in it and called up Carolyn and told her I was writing you. That fine girl had only cheerful things to say, and her voice just sounded glad. She said the best news she had—after being out all day—was to come home and find two letters from you. She also stated that the children are all fine and, in fact, everything was fine. Just what I would have expected from her, so I'll wind up here with good night.

Keep cheerful.

P. S. No. 2. I am taking up with Jerry Land and, in fact, already had before receiving your letter, the question of radio operators in his Merchant ships.

Regarding the docking of the four ships you mentioned:—I knew Jerry had had his troubles on this score, so many departments being involved and hands being tied.

[1] Op-10D-MD

NOVEMBER 1, 1941.

DEAR TOMMY: This will be in answer to yours of September 30 and October 7. It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are in good fettle.

I am glad you wrote the official letter about the slowness with which official documents reach you. Of course, I am very sorry that conditions were such that the letter was *required*. I think the situation will be met alright; give us a jolt if it occurs again; it's the only way we can lick it.

I have run down what information I could on the status of the Radar equipment which was slated for the Sixteenth Naval District.

I find that two (2) units SCR-268 and one (1) unit 270-b had been shipped from San Francisco on September 8, 1941. I was later advised that the Department had been informed that the equipment arrived in Manila on September 29, 1941. By this time, I suppose installation is well under way. I am hoping that it will live up to expectations. If it does, it will be a great help.

Your reference to the Russians! I agree that it would be a fine idea to get as much information as possible about them. At the moment, there seems to be little chance of learning anything authoritative. An officer on duty in the Department (in the far Eastern section of O. N. I.) recently returned from temporary duty in London. During the course of his "inquiring around" in the Admiralty, a Britisher in the Intelligence branch remarked of the Russians that they were "Inquisitive, Acquisitive, and Secretive." That seems to about size them up. Our officer stated that the British *just don't* have anything of value on them. The British *think*, however, that the Russian Navy is probably better than we might ordinarily be inclined to think. The secretiveness of the Russians is hard to understand. I suppose, however, so many hands have been turned against them in the past that their current attitude is merely an outgrowth of the past. Even so, they do not permit the foreign attaches and correspondents to go to the front.

[2] Our Moscow Mission, as you no doubt know, has returned. Admiral Standley is enthusiastic about the Russians. He feels that they will hold on for a long time to come. I am informed that General Burns shares his views. I hope they are correct. One thing we *do* know is that they are in need of much material. How that is going to be gotten to them remains a problem which will give us many a headache before it is solved.

I am sorry that the PT situation was not better handled. I trust that the many problems in connection with them can be worked out. The tender situation is in hand, and I hope the fuel arrangements can be satisfactorily handled too.

The Bureau of Ships has informed me that spare parts ample to recondition engines on the station were shipped from Detroit on October 5, 1941. Further, seventy-five percent of the base tools are scheduled for delivery between now and February, 1942. Ships is sending a factory service engineer to Manila. Captain Kintner has just called to say that, depending on the vagaries of transportation, this engineer should arrive some time in November.

As noted above, I trust that the fuel situation works out satisfactorily. For the time being, and until you can get 100 octane gas, BuShips advises that you can use 87 octane at 4/5 load. This, I am informed, is the only type of gas that was available to these craft during their employment in the South last winter.

I hope that the PTs will be of real service to you. The British think they are fine. On the other hand, I quote about them from a recent letter from Kimmel:

"The 12 PTs which you sent to us I fear will be of very little use in this area. We sent them on an average day to make a trip from Oahu to Molokai. The reports of this trip have gone forward officially. They were practically useless in this sea and could not make more than 10 knots. Several of them had to turn back and a few personnel were quite seriously injured from being thrown about. We need something much more substantial to be of any use out here."

We are considering sending you six (6) more PTs and the NIAGARA as a tender. We are asking the Bureau of Ships to get the "FLORENCE D" for employment as you propose. That will let you have the GOLD STAR up your sleeve for velvet.

These boats have shown weakness when pounded into heavy seas. I might add that we know the weaknesses of these PTs. We gave them some grueling tests in fairly heavy weather from New London up around Block Island, down around Fire Island and back. They made a destroyer [3] hump to stay with them, but all the boats which made the race suffered severe structural damage. We deliberately pounded them to see what they would stand and to develop their weaknesses. Profiting by what we learned, we hope to develop a much sturdier craft. Meanwhile, we sent out what we had, hoping they would be of some use.

I trust you will be glad to get the additional SS.

Sorry we cannot give you any more PBTs at the moment. They are just not to be had. The PBTs that we have gotten to date are not, as one might suppose, the result of our "big (May, 1940) money". New production of these will not come off the line until April, 1942. The planes that are *now* leaving the factories are those contracted for and paid for by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands. The VOS we are sending you is a *good* plane. The engines are excellent, and there are no "bugs" in them. Next to the PBY, they are decidedly the best type we have for your purpose. They can carry two 325-pound depth bombs, and that is pretty good. Two hundred forty (240) of these depth bombs are on their way out, and some seven hundred twenty (720) more are to follow shortly. I believe these planes will do good work for you as an inner anti-submarine patrol. It is true that the radio is not as high-powered as we wish it were—but even *that* might be to your advantage. These 24 planes and personnel will complete assembly by about January 1, 1942 at the Naval Air Station, San Pedro, and will be despatched from that point.

With reference to your problem of cooperation with the Army, I suggest that consideration be given to the agreement Kimmel and General Short are now using at Pearl Harbor. The name of the paper, a copy of which you now have is "Joint Security Measures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base." Our file room tells me it went out along with Serial 059230 of June 20, 1941.

Your remarks about the ballast in the ST. LOUIS are noted. Mike Robinson states that the need for ballast in that ship came about as the result of endeavoring to introduce extensive improvement and changes in an existing design. The ship was laid down as a development of the BROOKLYN class, with engine and boiler arrangements modified to decrease damage from underwater explosion; the secondary battery was changed from open pedestal mounts to enclosed twin 5''-25 caliber mounts; and finally fire control was extensively rearranged to improve overhead view. Twin 5''38 caliber guns were subsequently developed, and this type was adopted instead of the 5''-25 caliber. This, together with director alterations, put a great deal of topside weight in the ship. The result of these changes was that, while the ST. LOUIS was entirely satisfactory from damage stability point of view under loaded conditions, she was not satisfactory in a light condition, and ballast accordingly had to be added to make her satisfactory to withstand heavy underwater [4] damage under any conditions of load. Subsequent alterations, recommended by the King Board, added more weight; this, of course, required that additional ballast be added. Mike Robinson remarked: "I feel very bad about the whole situation. I hardly think anyone can be *blamed*. If blame there be, it should be on our Naval Treaty Limitations. When one is given 10,000 tons around which to construct a ship, it follows that every effort is going to be made to get as much into the ship as possible. This the constructors did. When the new requirements for heavy anti-aircraft batteries came along, there just wasn't enough reserve stability left in the design to take care of the additional weights." Voila.

I took up the matter of Brooke-Popham's activities and the publicity given the meetings of the United States and British Commanders in the Far East with Admiral Sir Charles Little of the British Joint Staff Mission. A few days since, I had a note from him which said, "We have referred the matter to the Chiefs of Staff in London." It would seem that that reference should take care of the matter.

I referred the matter of your mines to the Bureau of Ordnance. Blandy has just brought in a letter which appears to cover the subject pretty thoroughly. I am enclosing a copy of it, which may be of assistance to you.

I am sorry about Bemis. It was our impression that he would be a good one for that job. You have had tough luck with your commandants.

As for your recommendation about Glassford. I am not prepared to give you an answer at this moment. I appreciate the fact that he has been out there well over two (2) years, but these are unusual times. The Department of State has many reasons why a Flag Officer should be kept on the river. We practically have to go along with them on this, and I can think of no one at the moment better qualified for the job than Glassford. I will discuss with Nimitz the many angles that your recommendation suggests to me and see if we can't work out something.

In your letter of August 19, you recommended that the Department select the officer it desired ultimately to relieve you and send him out forthwith. More recently (September 30) you asked what had become of Horne's and Green-slade's candidacy for your job. All I can say at the moment is that neither of

these officers is available and both are doing important duty in their present assignments.

Of course, I have been searching my mind for some time for someone who has *all* the many exacting qualifications for your relief. As you can well imagine—but, due to modesty, you would probably not admit—the job of finding someone to measure up to your standards has not been an easy one. Many officers no doubt are *available*, but, in the *important* job you now hold, the run-of-the-mine chap just will not do. We have to have the *very best*. To list just *some* of the necessary qualifications: he must be acceptable to the President and the Secretary; he must be mentally and physically vigorous; he must possess a fine strategical mind; he must be an inspiring leader; he must be possessed of great common sense and balance; he must be able to take care of us in conferences and guard us with the British while still viewing the problem as a whole; he must have a profound knowledge of the employment of the most important weapon he will have at his disposal—the submarine; and, finally, I must have *complete confidence* in him. Your station is the front line trench and one with no less qualifications than those listed can be considered.

I am considering *Nimitz*; it would be like losing one of my arms here; I have not even broached it to the Secretary. I am just telling you what is in my mind—if and when you tell me you feel you should be relieved.

I realize 3 years are a long time on the Asiatic—particularly when it stretches out indefinitely beyond a life of service and normal retiring age. It was not easy for me to ask you to continue in the Far East—in lots of ways I hated to do it—but I could think of no one else so well qualified to serve our country out there in time of stress. Moreover, I did it also because I know your rugged honesty—and that you will unhesitatingly tell me if you think, *for any reason* I should send out someone else. Please tell me exactly how you feel about it.

With all good wishes.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral T. C. HART, U. S. Navy
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
% Postmaster, Asiatic Station,
San Francisco, California.

[1] Secret

(Re6b)

From: The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance

To: The Chief of Naval Operations

Subject: Effect of Sea Growth on Mines with Special Reference to a Mine Recovered in Manila Bay and Reported in a Personal letter from Admiral Hart to Admiral Stark

1. A dispatch has been prepared containing essentially the following:

"More detailed report on recovered mine including photographs is requested. It is suggested that this mine may have been the one reported lost in Sixteenth Naval District letter S76-1 Serial C-9001 dated 5 February 1941. Attention is called to the fact that tests as long as two years off Kitty Hawk and in Florida waters even when resulting in apparent encrustation did not prevent operation. It is suggested that condition of field in Manila Bay be tested by sweeping a few mines at the end. First so as to make contact with antennae and second so as to cut steel mooring with subsequent inspection under control of personnel trained in mine recovery."

2. More detailed comment has been submitted by Commander J. B. Glennon of the Naval Ordnance Laboratory as follows:

"The following comments are submitted relative to sea growth on mines at Cavite and elsewhere:

"In carrying out mine endurance tests off the coast of North Carolina, the Bureau has encountered the problem of sea growth on all assemblies not promptly recovered. Observation of tests units on return to the Naval Ordnance Laboratory practically always gives an impression similar to, but in lesser degree than that outlined by Admiral Hart. It generally appears that steel surfaces are encrusted and horns at times rendered inoperative by a rigid layer of marine growth. Investigation of this feature has shown that the condition of the marine growth changes very rapidly when removed from the sea water, and that growths which readily brush away when under water become rigid obstructions once

they start drying out. Thus this dry coating does not give a true picture of the service condition.

[2] "Underwater tests on heavily coated mines and floats down seven months at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, showed that mine horns and float horns readily functioned on impact. Mines tested for endurance over considerably longer periods in the same water frequently have been fired by contacting the antenna with a steel wire. In general, difficulty in firing on the test field due to fouled antenna has never been reported.

"There are four distinct ways in which sea growth might be pictured as interfering with the operation of the Cavite mines:

(a) *Heavy coating on the lower antenna.* This antenna serves as mine mooring cable and is held rigid under a 300 lb. tension. It is $\frac{1}{2}$ " pure copper rope. Rubbing of this rigid wire by passing submarine should brush aside any wet growth that will cling to copper after a few months exposure.

(b) *Heavy coating on upper antenna.* The tension in this antenna is probably less than 30 lbs. There appears the possibility that brushing contact of a submarine might not clear a bright spot through even a wet coating on this antenna. However, irregularities on the submarine can exercise extra stress in passing. More important, this copper antenna is fitted with a horned float.

(c) *Float horns.* Each of these consists of a copper cup surrounding a star shaped steel disc. Any sea growth existing on the copper surface of the cup need only be punctured or brushed aside by a sharp steel point of the star shaped disc when the horn is bumped by a passing ship.

(d) *Mine horns.* These consist of a copper disc within a steel cup. The blunt edge of the copper disc must be driven through any wet sea growth between cup and disc. The available force for this blow between a ship and a mine, weighing more than 500 lbs. appears sufficient to brush aside reasonable quantities of wet sea growth as this open space is only $\frac{1}{4}$ " wide.

"So long as any one of these four means of firing remains open, the mine should be considered dangerous.

[3] "It appears desirable to know whether the mine recovered by fishermen at Cavite was inspected by Naval authorities before or after exposure to the air, if any immersed parts were tested for sea growth resistance what was the finding? Did sea growth on mine cling to copper surfaces? In addition, information is desired as to whether the mine was opened and inspected by Naval personnel, were the safety devices or other features tested for performance, was the mine positively identified as a live-loaded unit recently planted, has a report been submitted to the Bureau of Ordnance.

"Commandant Sixteenth District's letter S76-1 Serial C-9001 dated 5 February 1941 reported the laying of two experimental mines off Corregidor on 6 August 1940. One of these was recovered complete on 29 January 1941 and was reported upon in detail. As no mention of sea growth appears in the report, it would seem that this objectionable feature is not always present to an important degree. Photographs of these Cavite mines after six months submergence show no evidence of abnormal sea growth.

"Nothing in the above should be taken to indicate that the Naval Ordnance Laboratory desires to belittle the bad effect of sea growth upon mines, especially those in tropical waters. The Cavite mines will suffer both in firing efficiency and tidal efficiency. The field should be continually augmented with new mines. Present estimates are that the Cavite mines should be considered ineffective 'after one year.'"

3. In addition to measures which may be taken to repair deficiencies of the present fields by addition of Mark 6 mines, it is intended to supply new types of mines for use by the Asiatic Fleet in the defense of the same areas. The procurement of these mines has started and shipments will begin at an early date.

/s/ W. H. P. BLANDY.

LWMcK/ELH

Op-100-MD

NOVEMBER 7, 1941.

DEAR TOMMY: Recently, the Fifth Sea Lord, Rear Admiral A. L. St. George Lyster, Royal Navy, visited the United States. He made a careful inspection of our manner of operation of aircraft and our aircraft facilities, both afloat and ashore. On the conclusion of his inspection, he submitted to us his frank observations in the form of the attached notes. I thought they would be of interest

and am sending them along. Admiral Lyster impressed all of us as being an exceptional officer.

In addition, I am sending a copy of the notes made by Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten as the result of his observations in the fleet. He, too, impressed me as being a very capable officer. He is keen, alert, intelligent, and is remarkably articulate. In brief, he makes a very splendid impression. I am sure much good will result from the observations of both of these officers.

Events are moving rapidly toward a real showdown, both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific. The Navy is already in the war of the Atlantic, but the country doesn't seem to realize it. Apathy, to the point of open opposition, is evident in a considerable section of the press. Meanwhile, the Senate is dragging out the debate with reference to the arming of the merchantmen. Whether the country knows it or not, *we are at war*.

The sinking of the REUBEN JAMES, together with its large loss of life, will do much to bring closer home this fact. Incidentally, early reports indicate that she was struck on the port side just about the vicinity of the magazine. It is probable that the magazine exploded, since the forward part of the ship just disintegrated. There were only two survivors from the forward part of the ship—the boatswain's mate of the watch and the helmsman.

The SALINAS did a good job of getting in—She took two torpedo hits with no loss of life. The submarine surfaced fairly close aboard sometime after the torpedoing and the Salinas thinks she got a shell into her. The submarine submerged and her position was given a good depth charging by a nearby destroyer. They think they got her!

You no doubt have noted in the press the conversations going on between the State Department and the Japanese Foreign Office. Mr. Kurusu's trip to the United States has its dramatic appeal, but I am dubious of it having any real influence.

I hope this finds you in fine fettle. Keep cheerful! With all good wishes.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral T. C. HART, U. S. N.

U. S. S. HOUSTON,

c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

Enclosures—Mountbatten's notes

Lyster's notes

Secret

Op-10-MD

NOVEMBER 8, 1941.

DEAR TOMMY: We have at last gotten a decision regarding withdrawal of the Marines. I have immediately acquainted you with that fact by radio. The gun boats are still in the balance, and we have requested further word from you on this.

The Japanese situation looks almost like an impasse to me, and I wouldn't be surprised at anything happening in the next month or two. I imagine your picture of that is just about as close as mine. The two points of view appear to me simply irreconcilable. But of this, more should be in the open before long.

I have been pressing Marshall to press the British for more air force in the Singapore area. I won't go into the details, but I think we have very good grounds from every standpoint, both as to their present position at home, as well as from their position in the Far East, and their airplane situation in general, to insist on their strengthening the Malay barrier. As you know, the British Navy is sending marked increases to the Eastern theater. I only wish we could have gotten all this started some time ago. It might have acted as a very great deterrent, but, in any case, I feel that the speeding up of these operations at present is vital.

Here's hoping.

Every good wish.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral T. C. HART, U. S. N.

Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, U. S. S. AUGUSTA,

c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.